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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appellants originally brought this Appeal before the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Section 78-2-2(3)(i), as the Judgment appealed from is one over 
which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction. Pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme 
Court, this appeal was transferred to this Court for disposition 
on July 8, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This is an Appeal from a Judgment entered on April 1, 
1987, by the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
following a bench trial before the Honorable David B. Dee, 
District Court Judge, on January 6-8, 1985. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Annotated, 22-1-1 et. seq. 
2. Utah Code Annotated, 57-1-13. 
3. Utah Code Annotated, 25-5-1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
T h i s i s an a c t i o n b r o u g h t by A p p e l l a n t s a g a i n s t 
Respondents J o e l and LaWanna F. Edwards for breach of a Uniform 
Rea l E s t a t e C o n t r a c t , waste and f raud , Hal D. and Myrna Barker 
f o r w a s t e , and S i d D a v i s and Jo Vance C a s p e r f o r b r e a c h o f 
f i d u c i a r y duty and f raud . 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1 
The Respondents Davis and Casper did not file Counter-
claims against the Appellants as was represented in the course 
of proceedings in Appellant's Brief. These said parties, during 
the proceedings, did not file any Counterclaims or Cross-Claims. 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Following a bench trial, the Trial Court issued a 
Memorandum Decision (a copy of which is included as "Exhibit A" 
in the Addendum to Appellants' Brief). Thereafter, Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law were issued ("Exhibit B" in the 
Addendum of Appellants' Brief), and Judgment was entered dis-
missing all nine causes of action in Appellants' Complaint. 
Respondents Davis and Casper did not file any Counterclaim or 
Cross-Claim. 
D. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants had tried, on their own without success, to 
sell their home for approximately two months (T. Vol.1 P.9) 
before listing with Casper and Company for six months (see 
Exhibit 20 and T. Vol. I p. 76). After the expiration of the 
first Listing Agreement a new Listing Agreement was entered into 
for an additional three month period as per Exhibit 1. The home 
did sell and culminated in a closing that took place on May 23, 
1980 (T. Vol. I p. 9) at which time the Listing Agreement, by its 
own terms, terminated. 
During the time the Respondents Casper and Davis had 
listings with the Appellants there were open houses, paper ads, 
and the property was listed with the Multiple Listing Service 
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(T. Vol. I P.11). Appellant Theodore B. Salazar testified that 
he was not dissatisfied with the efforts made to sell his home 
(T. Vol. I p. 79) , and that after the closing there was no 
other written document entered into with the realtors, the 
Respondents Casper and Davis (T. Vol. I p. 79 and T. Vol. I p. 
100), and no further money was ever paid to said Respondents by 
Appellants. 
One of the problems in selling the home was that the 
first mortgage holder, Prudential Federal Savings, had a due on 
sale clause which required that the home be refinanced if a sale 
was discovered (see Exhibit 25 and T. Vol. I p. 115-116). 
Although the FHA Appraisal for the home was $56,350.00 (Exhibit 
26 T. Vol. I p. 117), the home did sell for Appellants' asking 
price of $59,900.00 (T. Vol. II p. 11), and pursuant to the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, the balance owed by Respondents 
Edwards was to be paid on or before June 1, 1981, through 
refinancing the property or assuming the existing loan (T. Vol. 
II p. 12). 
Subsequent to the closing, Respondents Edwards mailed, 
directly to the Salazars, the money for the mortgage payments 
and, apparently, Appellants then mailed a payment on to Pru-
dential Federal Savings. The Respondents Casper and Davis had no 
further contact with Appellants after the closing until the 
spring of 1981, when, in about the middle of March of 1981, Mr. 
Edwards had accepted new employment in Idaho and had decided to 
move back to Idaho he contacted Mr. Davis to put the home back 
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on the market (T. Vol. II p. 14-15). When a Listing Agreement 
was obtained from the Edwards, Mr. Davis, as agent for Edwards, 
informed the Appellants by calling them and telling them that the 
Edwards had put the home on the market and were attempting to 
sell it (T. Vol. II p. 140-141). 
The Appellants tried to borrow $10,000.00 against the 
home after the sale to try to get some of their remaining 
equity out of the home, but could not because they resided out 
of state (T. Vol. I p. 81 and p. 102). 
The Respondent Davis suggested to the Appellants that 
perhaps the Respondent Edwards would be able to borrow $10,000.00 
against the property and give the money to Appellants if the 
Edwards could be given more time to sell the property (T. Vol. 
II p. 141-142 and T. Vol. Ill p. 26). Subsequently, at Mr. 
Salazar's request, a meeting was held in Utah at the home of one 
of his relatives. In order for the Edwards to borrow against 
the property, Appellants needed to give Edwards a Warranty Deed 
to the property (T. Vol. II p. 142), and two ways were suggested 
to protect the balance of Appellants' equity: (1) A Trust Deed 
and Trust Deed Note; and (2) A Deed signed by the Edwards to be 
kept in the file and recorded at a later time if things didn't 
work out. After explaining the time period involved with a Trust 
Deed, the Appellant Mr. Salazar decided he wanted the Edwards to 
sign a Quit Claim Deed back to Appellants (T. Vol. II p. 148). 
Respondent Davis helped to arrange the second mortgage, and at 
the Appellants' request, the $10,000.00 they wanted out of the 
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property was wired directly to their Las Vegas bank account (T. 
Vol. I p. 36), because it was safer and faster than mailing a 
check (T. Vol. I p. 82). The Appellants were fully advised that 
the $10,000.00 they wanted and couldn't get on their own was 
coming from a second mortgage to be placed on the home through 
Edwards (T. Vol. Ill p. 35-37). 
After the Appellants received the $10,000.00 on June 
12, 1981, the Edwards continued to make mortgage payments to 
Appellants for the first mortgage since it was in their name and 
paid the second mortgage payments through September of 1981. 
Continuing efforts to sell the home resulted in a contract 
between the Respondents Edwards and Barkers for the sale of the 
home. Respondent Davis fully advised Appellants regarding the 
terms of the Edwards-Barker transaction and how the payments 
would be made (T. Vol. Ill p. 39), and Appellant Mr. Salazar 
approved of the transaction (T. Vol. Ill p. 39-40 & 42). After 
the Edwards-Barker transaction was finalized Mr. Salazar in-
structed Respondent Davis to record the Edwards' Quit Claim Deed 
(T. Vol. I p. 102-103). Mr. Salazar, during his deposition and 
also at the trial under cross examination, testified that he 
understood that by recording the Quit Claim Deed from the 
Edwards that that terminated the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
between Appellants and Respondent Edwards (T. Vol. I p. 104-105). 
From October, 1981 through August of 1983, the Appel-
lants received and accepted $200.00 per month payments from 
Barkers through Beehive Properties Trust account marked "Contract 
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Sale Payment", "interest payment"f or "equity" and/or "contract 
payment" (see Exhibit 21 and T. Vol. I p. 105-108), and endorsed 
and deposited these checks in their bank account (T. Vol. I p. 
108). The payments on the first and second mortgage were also 
paid the same way through this period of time. 
Appellant Mr. Salazar, at the trial, claimed that he 
did not know of the existence of the second mortgage on the 
property until approximately six months after the Edwards-Barker 
transaction, but he continued to accept checks for another 16 
months after supposedly making this discovery. Respondent Davis 
testified that Mr. Salazar knew about it before the $10,000.00 
was wired to Appellants (T. Vol. Ill p. 51). 
Respondent Barkers started processing a V.A. loan in 
the early part of 1983, and the loan had been approved and the 
Barkers were waiting for the points to drop. Appellants could 
have avoided all of their alleged damages by being more patient 
and waiting for Barkers to close, but instead chose, through 
intimidation tactics, to force Barkers to leave the property. 
Barkers quit claimed to Salazars and Salazars subsequently 
resold the property for a higher price of $63,000.00. 
Approximately two weeks before the Barkers moved out 
of the home, Mrs. Salazar talked with Mr. Barker and was advised 
that the Barkers had qualified and that the loan would go 
through just as soon as the points came down (T. Vol. Ill p. 
105). Mrs. Barker also talked with Mrs. Salazar, and was told 
that she (Mrs. Salazar) "didn't understand her husband ct that 
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point, that he was very mad, very upset, and that he wanted 
somebody to pay" (T. Vol. Ill P. 105). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Uniform Real Estate Contract between Appellants 
and Respondents Edwards was terminated by the Appellants ordering 
the filing of a Quit Claim Deed from Edwards back to them. 
2. The unsigned crossed out Trust Deed Note of May 
20, 1981, was indefinite as to its validity and meaning and a 
dispute existed as to what, if anything, it represents, and the 
Trial Court correctly ordered that it was unenforceable. If, as 
Appellants argue, this was a modification of the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract between Appellants and Edwards, then this 
modification would also have terminated when the Quit Claim Deed 
from Edwards back to Appellants was filed. 
3. The Appellants did not prove any decrease in the 
value of the property as was alleged in their waste claims and 
the minimal amount for repairs that Appellants are now seeking 
was greatly disputed as to whether it was prior to Edwards1 
possession, normal wear and tear, after Appellants took the 
property back, or the result of vandals. If, in fact, the waste 
damages complained of did occur during the possession of Edwards 
or Barkers, the expense to the Appellants would have been 
avoided if Appellants would have allowed Barkers to finish 
buying the property. 
4. Appellants' claims of fraud were properly dis-
missed. 
7 
5. All of the breach of fiduciary claims pled by the 
Appellants against Respondents Davis and Casper were based on 
the Listing Agreement that terminated on May 23, 1980, and 
Appellants1 efforts to resurrect and add to the Listing Agreement 
for alleged breaches of fiduciary duties in May and June of 1981 
were properly dismissed by the Trial Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COORT CORRECTLY RULED IN 
DISMISSING ALL OP APPELLANTS' CLAIMS 
In order to overturn the ruling of the Trial Court, 
this Court must find that there was no basis in fact for the 
Trial Court's ruling. We must look at the facts in the light 
most favorable to the Defendants. The fact that on most issues 
there was conflicting testimony, and the fact that the Appel-
lants, in their Brief, have attempted to present the facts in 
the light most favorable to their position, is not a proper 
basis to overturn the Trial Court's ruling. The Trial Court was 
in the best position to judge the truth and veracity of the 
witnesses. 
The Respondents Davis and Casper will only briefly 
respond to those issues in which they are not directly involved: 
1. APPELLANTS' CLAIM OF BREACH OF CONTRACT BY RE-
SPONDENT EDWARDS. 
The Trial Court ruled that the Appellants waived their 
right to insist upon full performance as originally contemplated 
on June 1, 1981, and for the payment of the amount of $28,175.00 
and cited The Restatement of Contracts First Sections 297, 298, 
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299 and Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended Title 57-1-6 through 
13 (Memorandum Decision hereinafter cited as M.D. p.3-4). The 
Trial Courtf in making its decision on this issue, correctly 
noted the conveyance of a Warranty Deed by the Appellants to 
Edwards, the borrowing of $11,000.00 against the property, 
$10,000.00 of which was paid to and accepted by the Appellants, 
and the continued payment of the first and second mortgages by 
Edwards until September, 1981, and the recording of a Quit Claim 
Deed in October of 1981, which terminated the Salazar-Edwards 
contract (M.D. p.3). 
As noted in these Respondents1 Statement of Facts, the 
Appellant Mr. Salazar instructed the recording of the Edwards' 
Quit Claim Deed (T. Vol. I p. 102-103), and at the time he gave 
these instructions he understood that by the recording of the 
Quit Claim Deed it would terminate the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract between the Appellants and Respondent Edwards (T. Vol. I 
p. 104-105). 
2. APPELLANTS' CLAIM FOR ALLEGED BREACH OP UNSIGNED 
PROMISSORY NOTE. 
The Trial Court ruled that the facts clearly indicate 
that the Note was never signed and there existed a dispute as to 
what the Note represents, and because of its undefinitiveness and 
because it was unsigned, it is barred by the Statute of Frauds 
and unenforceable, and cited Utah Code Annotated 25-5-1 through 3 
(M.D. p.4). 
Exhibit 6, which is the alleged Note, is marked 
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unsigned copy and had a line crossing out Trust Deed Note and 
the words "Extension Agreement" were written in. Respondent 
Davis, who prepared this document, testified that the document 
was one of two options that he explained to the Salazars and 
that Appellant Mr. Salazarf instead of going for the Trust Deed 
and Trust Deed Note, decided he wanted the Edwards to sign a 
Quit Claim Deed (T. Vol. II p. 148)
 f and that the original 
document was never given to the Edwards to sign because the 
parties did not go this direction (T. Vol. Ill p. 65). Mr. Davis 
testified that the crossing out of "Trust Deed Note" was done to 
indicate that it was no longer valid and that another alternative 
had been chosen (T. Vol III p. 96). 
3. APPELLANTS' CLAIM THAT THEY ACCEPTED THE WRITTEN 
PROMISE OP MAY 20, 1981 (THE TRUST DEED PROMISSORY NOTE, AGAIN 
EXHIBIT 6) AND BASED THEREON DELIVERED THE WARRANTY DEED TO 
RESPONDENT EDWARDS. 
The Trial Court ruled that this claim was another claim 
for relief for breach of contract, and that the Statute of Frauds 
would require that the Agreement by in writing and signed. The 
Trial Court further ruled that the Court could not in equity 
construct an Agreement when there is not sufficient proof as to 
what the alleged Agreement represents and that the Appellants had 
not sustained the burden of establishing what the Agreement 
represents (M.D. p. 4). 
The Appellants' Complaint alleged that, supposedly, 
the Edwards were to pay $10,000.00 down and that the Warranty 
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Deed was for the purpose of getting another loan in the amount 
of $18,175.00 to fully pay off the balance owed. 
At the trial, Appellant Mr. Salazar testified that the 
Appellants had tried to borrow $10,000.00 against the home on 
their own and could not because they resided out of state (T. 
Vol. I p. 81 & 102). Respondent Davis testified that the 
Edwards were willing to borrow the $10,000.00 and give it to the 
Appellants in exchange for more time to sell the home (T. Vol. 
II p. 141-142 & T. Vol. Ill p. 26). Appellants fully understood 
and were advised that the $10,000.00 they received was from a 
second mortgage on the home through Edwards for the $10,000.00 
they couldn't get on their own (T. Vol. Ill p. 35-37). 
If the Warranty Deed was solely for the purpose of 
borrowing another $18,175.00, as the Appellants argued, then 
there would have been no need for a Trust Deed and Trust Deed 
Note or for the Quit Claim Deed chosen by the Appellants. 
4. CLAIM FOR WASTE AGAINST RESPONDENTS EDWARDS. 
The Trial Court ruled that the Appellants failed to 
prove their alleged repair costs and were not able to sustain the 
burden of showing that there was exclusive possession by Re-
spondents Edwards-Barkers and failed to show the alleged waste 
caused any decrease in the value of the property (M.D. p. 4). 
Appellants alleged in their Complaint that the waste 
was committed during the period of June 1, 1980 and October 7, 
1981, that it caused a $10,000.00 loss in the value of the 
property, and that under Utah Code Annotated, 78-38-2, 1953 as 
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amended, they were entitled to treble damages of $30,000.00. 
The house resold at a later time, after the Barkers 
quit claimed their interest to the Appellants for $63,000.00; it 
had originally been sold to the Edwards for $59,900.00. 
The Respondent Mr. Edwards testified that many of the 
problems existed at the time they took possession in June of 
1980. There was mention of vandals. The Appellants did not see 
the property for 3 1/2 years after they sold it to the Edwards. 
The minimal amount spent by the Appellants of $1,438.76, most of 
which was for labor, could easily be attributable to normal wear 
and tear for the period of time involved. 
5. CLAIM FOR FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION AGAINST 
RESPONDENTS EDWARDS. 
Appellants alleged in their First Cause of Action that 
allegedly the Edwards, when they entered into the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract with the Appellants, misrepresented that the 
Appellants would be paid the balance of their $28,175.00 remain-
ing equity on or before June 1, 1981, and that as a result of 
the said alleged misrepresentation the Appellants suffered 
damages of not less than $50,000.00 and said Respondents should 
be punished by the imposition of punitive dcunages of $50,000.00. 
The Trial Court found that the Appellants waived the 
payment of $28,175.00 due on June 1, 1981 for the same reasons 
already indicated by the Trial Court regarding Appellants' First 
Cause of Action (M.D. p. 4). See argument and facts concerning 
the Appellants1 First Cause of Action in 1 above. The Trial 
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Court noted that to allow the Appellants to retain Edwards1 real 
property rights by the filing of the Quit Claim Deed and then to 
allow the Plaintiffs to collect $28,175.00 would be clear unjust 
enrichment to the Appellants. As noted in 1 above, the Appellant 
Mr. Salazar requested the recording of the Edwards' Quit Claim 
Deed and he knew at the time of making this request that by so 
doing the Uniform Real Estate Contract with the Edwards termin-
ated. 
6. CLAIM FOR FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION AGAINST 
EDWARDS REGARDING THE WARRANTY DEED, THE $10r000.00 THAT WAS 
PAID TO APPELLANTS, HOW THE BALANCE OF $18,175.00 WAS TO BE PAID 
TO APPELLANTS. 
The Trial Court denied this claim on the grounds that 
it did not have any merit (M.D. p. 4). 
Basically the Appellants alleged as they did in their 
Second and Third Causes of Action that the Warranty Deed was 
given for a loan of $18,175.00 and that the Edwards were sup-
posedly to pay $10,000.00 of their own money instead of giving 
the Warranty Deed to Edwards to borrow the $10,000.00 that the 
Appellants could not qualify for because they resided out of 
state. See numbers 1, 2, and 3 above. 
Obviously the Trial Court did not believe the Appel-
lants. There was no need for either a Trust Deed Promissory 
Note and Trust Deed or the Quit Claim Deed if the Edwards were 
supposed to use their own $10,000.00 and then use the Warranty 
Deed for a $18,175.00 loan. If indeed this was the plan, the 
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Appellants would have been fully paid off and these documents 
would not have been necessary to protect the balance after the 
$10,000.00. Further, this alleged type of arrangement would not 
have solved the due on payment clause problem with the first 
mortgage holder (T. Vol. I p. 115-116 & Exhibit 25). 
7. APPELLANTS' CLAIM FOR WASTE AGAINST RESPONDENT 
BARKERS. 
The Trial Court denied this Cause of Action (Appel-
lants1 Ninth) for the same reasons it denied the waste claims 
against Respondents Edwards. See facts and argument under 4 
above. 
Again, the Appellant pled that the market value had 
diminished $10,000.00 and asked for treble damages in the sum of 
$30,000.00. The home sold for more than it had originally been 
sold for. Absolutely no testimony of a decrease in value was 
offered. Appellants did not plead repair costs in either of 
their waste claims and the items that were represented as having 
been damaged were hotly contested as to who and when and as to 
whether the damage was before possession by Edwards or after 
Barkers left, and whether it was normal wear and tear. 
The evidence offered by Appellants had nothing to do 
with the waste claims as they plead them in their Complaint. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED APPELLANTS 
CLAIM OF ALLEGED BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY BY 
RESPONDENTS CASPER AND DAVIS 
The Trial Court ruled that the claims made by Appel-
14 
lants of breach of fiduciary duty was not supportable by the 
evidence and testimony or the analysis of law. The Trial Court 
specifically noted that these Respondents fulfilled their 
obligation under the Sales Agency Agreementf Exhibit 1, and that 
after there was no fiduciary duty owed by them to Appellants as 
per Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 22-1-1 et seq. (M.D. 
p.6). 
Appellants' seventh claim in their Complaint claims 
that pursuant to a Sales Agency Agreement, Exhibit 1, that 
implicit in said Agreement these Respondents owed Appellants a 
fiduciary duty of trust, loyalty, honesty, and confidence in 
arranging for the sale of the Appellants' property. Despite the 
fact that said Sales Agency Agreement terminated by its own 
terms on May 23, 1980, when the sale to the Edwards closed, the 
Appellants claim that on or about May 20, 1981, that somehow 
Respondent Davis was still "their sales agent" and that he 
breached his fiduciary duty to them by: (a) working with Edwards 
to borrow the $10,000.00 that was given to the Appellants, (see 
Argument I, parts 1,2,3,5 and 6 above); (b) that he allegedly 
represented to Appellants that he would find other buyers for 
the property at a price and according to terms agreeable to 
Plaintiff (although at the time there was no Listing Agreement 
between the parties); (c) that on or about October 1, 1982, he 
allowed the Respondent Barkers to take possession of the property 
without any consent or authorization from Appellants; (d) that 
he failed and refused to remove the Barkers from the property. 
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Appellants claimed they suffered damages of $10,000.00 and Davis 
and Casper should be punished with punitive damages of $25,000.00 
(See Plaintiff's Complaint, seventh claim.) 
1. THE SALES AGENCY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THESE PARTIES 
HAD BEEN SUCCESSFULLY TERMINATED. 
Exhibit 1 is the Listing Agreement, the Respondents 
Casper and Davis did find an acceptable buyer, the Edwards, for 
the Appellants. A commission was paid at the closing on May 
23, 1980, and the Listing Agreement then having been fulfilled, 
terminated. Appellant Mr. Salazar acknowledged that there were 
open houses, paper ads, and that the property was listed with the 
Multiple Listing Service (T Vol. I p.11). He was not dissatis-
fied with the efforts to sell the home (T. Vol I. p. 79). After 
the closing on May 23, 1980, there was no other written document 
entered into with Respondents Casper and Edwards, and the Appel-
lants (T. Vol. I p.79). The Appellants never paid any further 
money to the Respondents (T. Vol. I p. 100). The next contact 
Respondent Davis had with Appellants was after he had signed a 
listing agreement with Edwards in March of 1981 to advise 
Appellants as the agent for Edwards, that the home had been put 
back on the market (T. Vol. II p. 140-141 & T. Vol. Ill p. 25). 
The Trial Court correctly ruled that these Respondents 
had fulfilled their obligation under the Sales Agency Agreement, 
(M.D. p. 6) and cited Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
22-1-1 et seq. As per Newell v. Halloran 68 U. 407, 250 P. 986, 
many years of satisfactory business relations between parties is 
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not sufficient to establish a fiduciary relationship, and Bradley 
v. Rasmussen 16 U. 2d 378, 401 P. 2d 710, the fact that Plain-
tiffs had confidence and trust in the Defendants was not suf-
ficient to establish a confidential relationship. 
2. IN MAY OP 1981f RESPONDENT DAVIS WAS HELPING 
RESPONDENTS EDWARDS AS THEIR AGENT NOT AS APPELLANTS1 AGENT. 
Respondent Davis had no further contact after May 23, 
1980, until March of 1981, (May of 1981 according to Mr. Sala-
zar's testimony, T. Vol. I p. 28), when he called Appellants and 
told them that the home had been put back on the market by 
Edwards and that he was marketing the home for Edwards (T. Vol. 
II p. 140-141). Since after May 23, 1980, there was never any 
further written agreement with Appellants and Appellants never 
paid any further money, it is not reasonable for the Appellants 
to think that Mr. Davis was still their agent. 
Appellants argue citing Pyles v. Cole, 241. S.W. 2d 
841 (Tenn 1951) where Sellor continued negotiations with the 
broker after the termination date, which resulted in a sale and 
where the seller was the beneficiary of further efforts by the 
broker which resulted in the sale, a commission was due and 
owing to the broker. Appellants argue that somehow the Sales 
Agency Agreement with these Respondents and Appellants would 
have been resurrected by the fact that Mr. Davis, 10 months 
later, got involved as the listing agent for another party. Our 
fact situation is clearly different from the Pyles case. The 
Appellants paid a commission on May 23, 1980, the terms of 
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Exhibit 1 had been fulfilled. The Appellants never paid or 
expected to pay a further commission. A new listing agreement 
was never entered into with these Respondents and Appellants. 
Any further efforts to sell the home were made pursuant to a 
listing agreement with Edwards. 
Appellants also alleged and argue that somehow Respond-
ent Davis owed a fiduciary duty to them to find a new buyer at a 
price and at terms agreeable to Appellants and that Davis advised 
Barkers to take possession of the property without Appellants 
consent or authorization. The Trial Court ruled that these 
claims were without merit because the Edwards were in legal 
possession of the property and entered into a legal contract for 
the sale to Barkers on October 1, 1981 (M.D. p.6). 
Respondent Davis testified that he fully advised the 
Appellants regarding the terms of the Edwards-Barker transaction 
and that Appellant, Mr. Salazar approved of the transaction (T. 
Vol. Ill P. 39-40, 42). 
3. RESPONDENT DAVIS HAD NO FIDUCIARY DOTY TO REMOVE 
BARKERS. 
Nothing in the Listing Agreement (Exhibit 1), that was 
supposedly resurrected after its fulfillment, required these 
Respondents to remove anyone from the property. These Respond-
ents were hired to sell the home; they did, and the transaction 
closed on May 23, 1980. 
Mr. Davis testified that he was never requested to 
evict the Barkers. (T. Vol. Ill P. 50) 
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4. APPELLANTS' NEW ARGUMENT CLAIMING A FAILURE TO 
DISCLOSE THREE TRUST DEED INVESTMENTS MADE BY RESPONDENT EDWARDS 
AFTER MAY 23, 1980 IS NOT A BREACH OF ANY FIDUCIARY DUTY AND WAS 
NOT THE REASON EDWARDS DID NOT REFINANCE THE PROPERTY. 
Appellants, in their brief, argue that somehow the 
Listing Agreement, that terminated on May 23, 1980, required 
Respondent Davis, in May and June of 1981, to disclose some 
investments Mr. Edward made after May 23, 1980. 
Respondents maintain that Exhibit 1 never required 
this and even if it did it was clear that no fiduciary relation-
ship under Exhibit 1 existed in May and June of 1981. 
Regarding the facts on these investments: Mr. Edwards 
testified that he had been paid back in full on two, that he 
paid Mr. Davis no commission and that he could not remember if 
the two paid back in full had been paid before or after June 1, 
1981 (T. Vol. II p. 42-43). Also he received payments on the 
other and eventually received an interest in the property to 
protect his investment (T. Vol. Ill P. 23). He contacted Mr. 
Davis (T. Vol. II P. 15). It was possible that these notes were 
due before June 1, 1981 (T Vol. Ill P. 23). Only $2,200.00 or 
$2,800.00 would have been needed for Edwards to refinance the 
property (T. Vol. Ill P. 24, 100, 101). The Edwards decided 
not to refinance the property because they had decided to move 
back to Idaho (T. Vol. II P. 34 & Vol. Ill P. 90, 100 and 101). 
There was never any evidence to indicate that Edwards could not 
have qualified for a refinancing of the home and in fact, they 
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did have credit to take the second mortgage out for the $10,000 
sent to Appellants, 
5. THE LATER DATING AND NOTARIZING OF THE EDWARDS1 
QUIT CLAIM DEED WAS NOT A BREACH OF ANY FIDUCIARY DUTY OWED 
APPELLANTS 
Respondent Edwards testified that the Quit Claim Deed 
to protect Appellants' remaining equity was signed almost immedi-
ately after the second mortgage was arranged (T. Vol. II P. 35). 
Respondent Davis testified that it was signed by Edwards contem-
poraneously with said transaction (T. Vol. II P. 148 & T. Vol. 
Ill P. 31). Davis testified that he did not normally date them 
or anything until he recorded them if he needed to (T. Vol. Ill 
p. 32). It was not recorded before the Barker transaction 
because Appellants had not demanded that it be recorded until 
after the transaction was complete (T. Vol. Ill P. 39 & 43). 
After the Barker transaction and after Appellant instructed Davis 
to record it, he did arrange for the recording by giving it to 
McGhie Title Company (T. Vol. Ill P. 45, 97). Davis did what 
Appellants asked him to do; how could this be a breach of 
fiduciary duty? 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED ALL OF APPELLANTS1 CLAIMS FOR 
FRAUD. 
See Argument I, numbers 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 above which 
involve the same facts and noted conflict of testimony. The 
Trial Court correctly ruled that Appellants had not established 
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their fraud claim by a preponderance of the evidence. (M.D. p. 7) 
Appellants alleged in their Complaint, eighth claim, 
that the Warranty Deed given to Edwards was only for the purpose 
of allowing a loan to pay the balance of $18,175.00 after 
supposedly Edwards paid another $10,000.00 of their own money 
instead of for the purpose of getting them the $10,000.00 of 
their equity that they could not get themselves because they 
resided out of state. Appellants asked for $10,000.00 damages 
and $25,000.00 punitive damages. 
In Appellants1 argument, it is claimed that damages 
were suffered of $2,038.79 in monthly City Consumer payments and 
that they were required to pay $11,131.76 to City Consumer 
Services; and that they lost $10,000 of equity in their home. 
In examining these figures and the record, it is clear 
that all of the City Consumer payments were paid by Edwards or 
Barkers through July of 1983, and there is no evidence that 
Barkers would not have continued making these payments, but for 
Appellants1 insistence and demanding a Quit Claim Deed from 
Barkers. The $11,131.76 figure represents the $10,000.00 
received by Appellants in June of 1981, and $1,131.76 closing 
costs which would have been paid by Barkers at the closing of 
their V.A. loan which had been approved prior to Appellants' 
demands that Barkers Quit Claim the property back to them. The 
Appellants did not lose any equity; they received the $10,000.00 
from the second mortgage and they later sold the home for more 
than they originally sold it for. What Appellants' fraud 
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theories represent is an effort to gain a windfall. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants did not meet their burden of proof at the 
trial. The Trial Court correctly dismissed all of Appellants1 
claims and a review of the record in the light most favorable to 
the Respondents shows that ample evidence exists to support the 
Trial Court's findings. Further damages were not proven to 
support the Appellants' various claims. It would be patently 
unjust to allow any claim allegedly incurred after Appellants 
ordered Respondents Edwards and Barker to Quit Claim the property 
back to Appellants. 
These Respondents respectfully submit that the judgment 
of the Trial Court be upheld and that they be awarded their costs 
and fees incurred herein. 
DATED this [(faf day of February, 1988. 
LEE BISH01 
Attorney jfJbn Respondents 
Davis and/Casper 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the Ilk day of February, 
1988, that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, 
postage prepaid to: 
Michael R. Sciumbato, #2894 Hal D. Barker 
Joseph H. Gallegos, #1143 Myrna Barker 
GALLEGOS & SCIUMBATO 54 East Vine, Apt. #6 
333 South Denver Street Murray, Utah 84107 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Defendants-Respondents Pro Se 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 22-1-1 et. seq. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 57-1-13. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 25-5-1. 
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TITLE 22 




22-3. Principal and Income Act. 
22-4. Prearranged funeral plans. 
22-5. Fiduciary security transfers. 





22-1-2. Payments made to fiduciaries. 
22-1-3. Repealed. 
22-1-4. Transfer of negotiable instruments by fiduciaries. 
22-1-5. Checks — Drawn by fiduciaries, payable to third persons. 
22-1-6. Checks drawn by or payable to fiduciary. 
22-1-7. Bank deposits in name of fiduciary. 
22-1-8. Checks drawn in name of principal. 
22-1-9. Deposits in fiduciary's personal account. 
22-1-10. Deposits in name of several trustees. 
22-1-11. Transactions prior to May 12,1925, excepted. 
22-1-U Definitions. In this chapter unless the context or subject mat-
ter otherwise requires: 
"Fiduciary" includes a trustee under any trust, expressed, implied, 
resulting or constructive, executor, administrator, guardian, conservator, 
curator, receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, assignee for the benefit of credi-
tors, partner, agent, officer of a corporation, public or private, public officer, 
and any other person acting in a fiduciary capacity for any person, trust 
or estate. 
"Principal" includes any person to whom a fiduciary as such owes an 
obligation. 
A thing is done "in good faith" when it is in fact done honestly, whether 
it is done negligently or not. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 86, § 1; R.S. 1933 & Jurisdictions that have adopted the Uni-
C. 1943, 29-1-1. form Fiduciaries Act include: Alabama, Ari-
. . zona, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawaii, 
Comparable Provisions.
 I d a h o > niinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Utah adopted the Uniform Fiduciaries Act Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, 
effective May 12,1925, see 22-1-1 to 22-1-11. 
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New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylva-
nia, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Virgin Islands, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
Cross-References. 
Assignment for the benefit of creditors, 
6-1-1 et seq. 
Business Corporation Act, 16-10-1 et seq. 
Charitable Trust Act of 1971, 59-23-1 et 
seq. 
Investments generally, Title 33. 
Partnerships generally, 48-1-1 et seq. 
Personal representatives' powers and 
duties, 75-3-701 et seq. 
Principal and income apportionment, 
22-3-1 et seq. 
Real Estate Investment Trust Act, 16-12-1 
to 16-12-6. 
Receivers, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
66. 
Unlawful dealing with property by fiduci-
ary, 76-6-513. 
Breach of trust. 
Where employee of one of group of joint 
adventurers, seeking to buy and sell certain 
contiguous lands having valuable clay depos-
its, discovers clay on other adjoining land, 
obtains option thereon, and enters into ven-
ture with others upon consideration of his 
option being turned over to venturers, his 
employer is not chargeable with breach of 
trust toward other original venturers for 
failing to inform them of employee's discov-
ery until he obtained option. Lane v. Peter-
son (1926) 68 U 585, 251 P 374. 
Finding that son, who had confidential 
relationship with mother, had breached fidu-
ciary duty in purchasing mother's property 
was proper in view of, inter alia, extreme dis-
parity between market value of property and 
purchase price. Seequist v. Seequist (1974) 
524 P 2d 598. 
Creation of relationship. 
Many years of satisfactory business rela-
tions between parties is not sufficient to 
establish fiduciary relationship warranting 
cancellation of lease on ground of unfair 
advantage taken. Newell v. Halloran (1926) 
68 U 407, 250 P 986. 
Attorney who bought mining patent of 
bankrupt mining company, a former client, 
at trustee's sale and paid all creditors in full 
except one, whose claim, however, was fully 
discharged, did not hold patent as trustee for 
latter creditor. Lee v. Nelson (1926) 68 U 575, 
251 P 371. 
Elderly couple failed to establish a fiduci-
ary relationship between themselves, on the 
one hand, and their niece and her husband, 
on the other, where before executing a war-
ranty deed to the niece and husband, the 
elderly couple was advised extensively by 
counsel on two occasions, appeared to under-
stand fully the nature of the instruments 
they were signing and where they subse-
quently lived in harmony with the transfer-
ees on subject property until visiting their 
son. The fact that plaintiffs had confidence 
and trust in the defendants was not sufficient 
to establish a confidential relationship which 
would give rise to a presumption of 
unfairness in the transaction. Bradbury v. 
Rasmussen (1965) 16 U 2d 378,401 P 2d 710. 
Removal of trustee. 
Beneficiary of testamentary trust, empow-
ered by will to change trustee and whose con-
sent is necessary to all acts of trustee 
relating to investment of trust fund, may 
remove trustee without cause and procure 
appointment of another, subject to qualifica-
tion that latter is competent and other bene-
ficiaries' interests will not be jeopardized. In 
re Lowe's Estate (1926) 28 U 49, 249 P 128. 
Collateral References. 
Trusts <3=> 7. 
89 CJS Trusts § 1 et seq. 
76 AmJur 2d 247, Trusts § 2. 
Construction and application of Uniform 
Fiduciaries Act, affecting rights and obliga-
tions arising from payment of personal obli-
gations from trust funds, 114 ALR 1088. 
Construction of specific provision of will or 
trust instrument giving executor or trustee 
power to determine what is income or what 
is principal, 27 ALR 2d 1323. 
Existence of fiduciary relationship between 
bank and depositor or customer so as to 
impose special duty of disclosure upon bank, 
70 ALR 3d 1344. 
Standard of care required of trustee repre-
senting itself to have expert knowledge or 
skill, 91 ALR 3d 904. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
"Express" trust defined. 
The trust is an express one if it is so 
declared by the parties in the declaration of 
trust. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Stephens 
(1887) 5 U 319, 15 P 253, affd. 142 US 326, 35 
L Ed 1029,12 S Ct 277. 
22-1-2. Payments made to fiduciaries. A person, who in good faith 
pays or transfers to a fiduciary any money or other property which the 
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fiduciary as such is authorized to receive, is not responsible for the proper 
application thereof by the fiduciary; and no right or title acquired from 
the fiduciary in consideration of such payment or transfer is invalid in con-
sequence of a misapplication by the fiduciary. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 86, § 2; R.S. 1933 & 3 AmJur 2d 651, Agency § 291. 
C. 1943, 29-1-2. Right of trustee to withhold trust pay-
ments from beneficiary to obtain payment of 
Collateral References. personal debt of latter to him, or to set off 
Principal and Agent <S=> 154(1). such debt against payment to beneficiary, 8 
3 CJS Agency §§ 452-457. ALR 2d 209. 
22-1-3. Repealed. 
Repeal. securities held by fiduciaries, was repealed by 
Section 22-1-3 (L. 1925, ch. 86, § 3; R.S. 1933 Laws 1961, ch. 46, § 12. For present provi-
& C. 1943, 29-1-3), relating to transfer of sions, see 22-5-1 et seq. 
22-1-4. Transfer of negotiable instruments by fiduciaries. If any 
negotiable instrument payable or endorsed to a fiduciary as such is 
endorsed by the fiduciary, or if any negotiable instrument payable or 
endorsed to his principal is endorsed by a fiduciary empowered to endorse 
such instrument on behalf of his principal, the endorsee is not bound to 
inquire whether the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as 
fiduciary in endorsing or delivering the instrument, and is not chargeable 
with notice that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as 
fiduciary, unless he takes the instrument with actual knowledge of such 
breach or with knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instru-
ment amounts to bad faith. If, however, such instrument is transferred by 
the fiduciary in payment of, or as security for, a personal debt of the fiduci-
ary to the actual knowledge of the creditor, or is transferred in any trans-
action known by the transferee to be for the personal benefit of the 
fiduciary, the creditor or other transferee is liable to the principal, if the 
fiduciary in fact commits a breach of his obligation as fiduciary in transfer-
ring the instrument. 
History: L. 1925, ch. S6, § 4; R.S. 1933 & Collateral References. 
C. 1943, 29-1-4. Bills and Notes <3=> 340. 
Cross-References 1 0 C J S B i l l s a n d N o t e s § 326-
Uniform Commercial Code, Commercial , " A , m J u r 2 d m e t • * - B i l l s a n d N o t e s 
Paper, 70A-3-101 et seq. * 4 6 3 e t se<*-
22-1-5. Checks — Drawn by fiduciaries, payable to third persons. 
If a check or other bill of exchange is drawn by a fiduciary as such, or 
in the name of his principal by a fiduciary empowered to draw such instru-
ment in the name of his principal, the payee is not bound to inquire 
whether the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary 
in drawing or delivering the instrument, and is not chargeable with notice 
that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary, 
unless he takes the instrument with actual knowledge of such breach or 
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with knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument 
amounts to bad faith. If, however, such instrument is payable to a personal 
creditor of the fiduciary and delivered to the creditor in payment of, or 
as security for, a personal debt of the fiduciary to the actual knowledge 
of the creditor, or is drawn and delivered in any transaction known by the 
payee to be for the personal benefit of the fiduciary, the creditor or other 
payee is liable to the principal, if the fiduciary in fact commits a breach 
of his obligation as fiduciary in drawing or delivering the instrument. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 86, § 5; R.S. 1933 & Right of bank to pay out deposit directly 
C. 1943, 29-1-5. to beneficiary without the order of the 
n trustee or fiduciary in whose name it was 
Collateral References.
 m a d e > 2 ALR 1557. 
Deposit to individual account of checks or 
notes drawn or endorsed by agent or fiduci-
ary as charging bank with notice of misappli-
cation, 106 ALR 836,115 ALR 648. 
22-1-6. Checks drawn by or payable to fiduciary. If a check or other 
bill of exchange is drawn by a fiduciary as such, or in the name of his 
principal by a fiduciary empowered to draw such instrument in the name 
of his principal, payable to the fiduciary personally, or payable to a third 
person and by him transferred to the fiduciary, and is thereafter trans-
ferred by the fiduciary, whether in payment of a personal debt of the fidu-
ciary or otherwise, the transferee is not bound to inquire whether the 
fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary in transfer-
ring the instrument, and is not chargeable with notice that the fiduciary 
is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary, unless he takes the 
instrument with actual knowledge of such breach or with knowledge of 
such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounts to bad faith. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 86, § 6; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 29-1-6. 
22-1-7. Bank deposits in name of fiduciary* If a deposit is made in 
a bank to the credit of a fiduciary as such, the bank is authorized to pay 
the amount of the deposit or any part thereof upon the check of the fiduci-
ary, signed with the name in which such deposit is entered, without being 
liable to the principal, unless the bank pays the check with actual knowl-
edge that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary 
in drawing the check, or with knowledge of such facts that its action in 
paying the check amounts to bad faith. If, however, such a check is payable 
to the drawee bank and is delivered to it in payment of, or as security 
for, a personal debt of the fiduciary to it, the bank is liable to the principal, 
if the fiduciary in fact commits a breach of his obligation as fiduciary in 
drawing or delivering the check. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 86, § 7; R.S. 1933 & Cross-References. 
C. 1943, 29-1-7. Deposit accounts, 7-1-601 et seq. 
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Collateral References. Gift or trust by deposit in bank in anoth-
Banks and Banking <$=> 140(1). er' s n a m e o r m depositor's name in trust for 
9 CJS Banks and Banking §§ 338, 342. another, without his knowledge, 157 ALR 
76 AmJur 2d 582-587, Trusts §§ 367-373. 925,168 ALR 1324. 
Right of one indebted to insolvent bank to Gift or trust by deposit of funds belonging 
set off deposits which he has made as trustee, to depositor in bank account in name of nim-
55 ALR 822. self a n d another, 103 ALR 1123,135 ALR 993, 
Trust or preference in respect of funds 149 ALR 879. 
deposited by executors, administrators, testa- Liability of executor, administrator or 
mentary trustees or guardians, 37 ALR 120, trustee for interest or profits on funds depos-
101 ALR 602. ited in a bank in which he is interested, 88 
What property may be the subject of spe- ALR 205. 
cial deposit in bank, 50 ALR 247. Personal liability of officers or directors of 
Deposit by trustee of funds of separate bank in respect of trust funds illegally depos-
trusts in single bank account, 117 ALR 179. ited in bank, 112 ALR 1214. 
Deposit to individual account of checks or Responsibility of fiduciary for loss of funds 
notes drawn or endorsed by agent or fiduci- deposited in his own name or other form not 
ary as charging bank with notice of misap- indicating fiduciary character, 43 ALR 600. 
propriation, 106 ALR 836,115 ALR 648. Right of bank to pay out deposit directly 
Following trust funds deposited in mixed to beneficiary without the order of the 
bank account of trustees, 26 ALR 3, 35 ALR trustee or fiduciary in whose name it was 
747, 55 ALR 1275,102 ALR 372. made, 2 ALR 1557. 
22-1-8. Checks drawn in name of principal If a check is drawn upon 
the account of his principal in a bank by a fiduciary who is empowered 
to draw checks upon his principal's account, the bank is authorized to pay 
such check without being liable to the principal, unless the bank pays the 
check with actual knowledge that the fiduciary is committing a breach of 
his obligation as fiduciary in drawing such check, or with knowledge of 
such facts that its action in paying the check amounts to bad faith. If, 
however, such a check is payable to the drawee bank and is delivered to 
it in payment of, or as security for, a personal debt of the fiduciary to it, 
the bank is liable to the principal, if the fiduciary in fact commits a breach 
of his obligation as fiduciary in drawing or delivering the check. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 86, § 8; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943,29-1-8. 
22-1-9. Deposits in fiduciary's personal account* If a fiduciary makes 
a deposit in a bank to his personal credit of checks drawn by him upon 
an account in his own name as fiduciary, or of checks payable to him as 
fiduciary, or of checks drawn by him upon an account in the name of his 
principal, if he is empowered to draw checks thereon, or of checks payable 
to his principal and endorsed by him, if he is empowered to endorse such 
checks, or if he otherwise makes a deposit of funds held by him as fiduci-
ary, the bank receiving such deposit is not bound to inquire whether the 
fiduciary is committing thereby a breach of his obligation as fiduciary; and 
the bank is authorized to pay the amount of the deposit or any part thereof 
upon the personal check of the fiduciary without being liable to the princi-
pal, unless the bank receives the deposit or pays the check with actual 
knowledge that the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as 
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fiduciary in making such deposit or in drawing such check, or with knowl-
edge of such facts that its action in receiving the deposit or paying the 
check amounts to bad faith. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 86, §9; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 29-1-9. 
Cross-References. 
Unlawful dealing with property by fiduci-
ary, 76-6-513. 
22-1-10. Deposits in name of several trustees. When a deposit is 
made in a bank in the name of two or more persons as trustees and a 
check is drawn upon the trust account by any trustee or trustees autho-
rized by the other trustee or trustees to draw checks upon the trust 
account, neither the payee nor other holder nor the bank is bound to 
inquire whether it is a breach of trust to authorize such trustee or trustees 
to draw checks upon the trust account, and is not liable, unless the circum-
stances are such that the action of the payee or other holder or the bank 
amounts to bad faith. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 86, § 10; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 29-1-10. 
22-1-11. Transactions prior to May 12, 1925, excepted. The provi-
sions of this chapter shall not apply to transactions taking place prior to 
May 12,1925. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 86, § 11; R.S. 1933 & 




22-2-1. Death of trustee — Trust estate vests in successor. 
22-2-1. Death of trustee — Trust estate vests in successor. Upon the 
death of a sole or surviving trustee of an express trust the trust estate 
does not descend to his heirs or pass to his personal representatives, but 
shall by virtue hereof, upon the appointment and qualification of a succes-
sor to such trustee, become immediately vested in such successor in trust. 
History: Code Report; R.S. 1933 & C. Collateral References. 
1943, 29-2-1. Trusts <3=> 168,169(1). 
90 CJS Trusts §§ 236, 237. 
Cross-References.
 7 6 A m J u r 2d 373-376, Trusts §§ 132-134. 
Death of trustee of corporation sole, Account, duty of personal representative of 
16-7-10. deceased trustee to render, 36 ALR 3d 1071. 
Purpose of statute. 
The purpose of this statute is to protect 
the bank if it allows withdrawals on the per-
sonal order of a fiduciary who may be 
breaching his trust, unless the fiduciary's 
breach of trust is known to the bank. Movie 
Films, Inc. v. First Security Bank (1968) 22 
U 2d 1,447 P 2d 38. 
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encumbrances or defects in title, 109 A. L. 
R. 242. 
Signature with lead pencil, 8 A. L. R. 
1339. 
Statement as to use being made or in-
tended to be made of lands excepted or 
reserved from conveyance as limiting ef-
fect of exception or reservation, 139 A. L. 
R. 1339. 
"Surface," meaning as employed in con-
veyance or devise, 31 A. L. R. 1530. 
Term "land" or "real property" em-
ployed in contract or conveyance as cover-
ing mineral interests constructively sev-
ered from the land, 123 A. L. R. 848. 
Use or exploitation of property for a 
purpose other than, but not exclusive of, 
use specified by a deed creating a deter-
minable fee or a fee simple subject to con-
dition subsequent, 137 A. L. R. 639. 
Validity and effect of contract or deed 
which purports to cover or convey an 
undivided interest in land without speci-
fying the amount of the interest, 123 A. 
L. R. 912. 
History: R. a 1898 & 0. I*. 1907, § 1982; 
C. L. 1917, §4882; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
78*1-12. 
•Xtftr-acquired title. 
Quitclaim deed operates to convey estate 
of grantor "at the date of such convey-
ftiictf," and does not convoy an aftor-
•*quired title. Duncan v. Hemmelwright, 
\V: U. 2G2, 186 P. 2d 965. 
An after-acquired title does not pass by 
t quitclaim deed. Dowse v. Kammerman, 
U2 U. 85, 246 P. 2d 881. 
A quitclaim deed does not raise an es-
lui.jnjl as to an after-acquired title. Dowse 
». Kammerman, 122 U. 85, 246 P. 2d 881. 
Validity and effect ot conveyance of in-
terest remaining in grantor upon convey-
ance of a fee subject to a conditional 
limitation, or terminable upon breach of 
a condition subsequent, 53 A. L. R. 2d 224. 
Validity and effect of deed which pur-
ports to convey specified acreage or quan-
tity of land out of larger tract, with or 
without right of selection expressed, 117 
A. L. R. 1071. 
Validity and effect of reservation in 
deed of the right to proceeds, or part of 
the proceeds, of a future sale or condem-
nation of the property or part thereof, 123 
A. L. R. 1474. 
Validity, construction and effect of pro-
visions in deed from one spouse to other 
by which title was to revert in event o* 
conditions affecting marital relations, 116 
A. L. R. 1400. 
Waiver of breach of condition subse-
quent in instrument conveying title to real 
property, 39 A. L. R. 2d 1116. 
Which of conflicting descriptions in 
deeds or mortgages of extent of interest 
conveyed prevails, 115 A. L. R. 192. 
Force and effect of section. 
Statutory form of quitclaim deed is 
permissive only, and use ot words "re-
mise, release and quitclaim" in deed to 
mining claim passed all of grantor's title. 
Ruthraff v. Silver King Western Min. & 
Mill. Co., 95 U. 279, 80 P. 2d 338, distin-
guished in 112 U. 52, 185 P. 2d 264. 
Quitclaim deeds do not imply the con-
veyance of any particular interest in the 
property. Grantee acquires only interest 
of his grantor, "be that interest what it 
may." Nix v. Tooele County, 101 U. 84, 
118 P. 2d 376. 
The fact that a grantee who had pro-
cured a quitclaim deed did nothing what-
57-1-13. Form of quitclaim deed—Effect.—Conveyances of land may 
also be substantially in the following form: 
QUITCLAIM DEED 
(here insert name), grantor, of (insert place of 
residence), hereby quitclaims to (insert name), grantee, of 
(here insert place of residence), for the sum of dollars, 
the following described tract of land in County, 
Utah, to wit: (here describe the premises). 
Witness the hand of said grantor this day of , 
19 
Such deed when executed as required by law shall have the effect of a 
conveyance of all right, title, interest and estate of the grantor in and 
to the premises therein described and all rights, privileges and appurte-
uauces thereunto belonging, at the date of such conveyance. 
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MARKETING WOOL 
(Repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 154, § 10-102) 
25-4-1 to 25-4-3. Repealed. 
Repeal. to 33-4-3), relating to the marketing of 
Sections 25-4-1 to 25-4-3 (L. 1931, ch. wool, were repealed by Laws 1965, ch. 
54, §§ 1 to 4; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 33-4-1 154, § 10-102. 
C H A P T E R 5 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Section 25-5-1. Estnto or interest in real property* 
25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted. 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands. 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed. 
25-5-5. Representation as to credit of third person. 
25-5-6. Promise to answer for obligation of another—When not required to 
be in writing. 
25-5-7. Contracts by telegraph deemed written. 
25-5-8. Right to specific performance not affected. 
25-5-9. Agent may sign for principal. 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property.—No estate or interest in 
real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any 
trust or power over or concerning real property or in any manner relating 
thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or declared other-
wise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing 
subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or 
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
History: R. S. 1898 & 0. L. 1907, §§ 1974, tion governed by legislative intent. In 
2461; O. L. 1917, §§4874, 5811; R. S. 1933 - re Reynolds' Estate, 90 U. 415, 62 P. 2d 
& C. 1943, 33-5-1. 270. 
Sale implies creation of an estate in 
Compiler's Notes. excess of a leasehold, by act of the owner. 
Analogous foimer statute, Coinp. Laws Lewis v. Dahl, 108 U. 486, 161 P. 2d 362, 
1876, § 1010. distinguished in 1 U. (2d) 354, 267 P. 2d 
237. Cross-References. 
Contract for sale of goods for $500 or Adjoining landowners, 
more unenforceable in absence of some The statute of frauds applies to adjacent 
writing, 70A-2-201. landowners, as well as to persons who are 
Enforceability of security interests, not so situated. Tripp v. Bagley, 74 U. 
70A-9-203. 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A. L. R. 1417, distm-
Statute of frauds for contracts for sale guished in 10 U. (2d) 370, 353 P. 2d 911. 
of goods, 70A-2-201.
 A . A ^ 
Statute of frauds for contracts for sale Agent s authority, 
of securities, 70A-8-319. Where, at time agreement for purchase 
Statute of frauds for kinds of personal of land was entered into, there was no 
property not otherwise covered, 70A-1-206. statute requiring agent's authority to con-
tract for purchase of real estate to be in 
Construction and application. writing, contract would not be invalidated. 
This section docs not apply unless there Le Vine v. Wlutehouse, 37 U. 260, 109 P. 
is a contract. Skeen v. Van Sickle, 80 2, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 407. 
U. 419, 15 P. 2d 344. In action for specific performance of 
The meaning of the word "interest" in contract for sale of real property, held in 
this section depends on statutory construe- absence of evidence showing defendant's 
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uoent was authorized in writing to sell 
real property or equities taking case out 
of statute of frauds, trial court properly 
granted motion for dismissal of action. 
Lee v. Polyhrones, 57 U. 401, 195 P. 201. 
A corporation cannot be held to be tne 
agent of or a trustee for a stockholder 
unless this section is complied with. Geary 
v. Cain, 79 U. 268, 9 P. 2d 396. 
There is no requirement that the agent 
of the lessee or assignee be authorized 
in writing to execute the lease or assign-
ment. Zeese v. Estate of Siegel, 534 P. 
2d 85. 
Agreements as to liens. 
Under this section, a parol agreement 
imposing an additional lien upon real 
uNtnto is within the statute. Jackson v. 
Dallin, 47 U. 312, 152 P. 341. 
Assignments. 
Where several partners buy land, and 
one of them thereafter assigns one-half 
of his interest by oral agreement to a 
third person, such assignment is not with-
in the statute of frauds. Knauss v. Ca-
hoon, 7 U. 182, 26 P. 295, followed in 
Coffin v. Mcintosh, 9 U. 315, 34 P. 247. 
Blank deeds or papers. 
Blank deeds which were executed before 
description had been placed thereon were 
void and did not convey any interest or 
title whatever. Utah State BIdg. & Loan 
Assn. v. Perkins, 53 U. 474, 173 P. 950, 
applying Coinp. Laws 1907, § 1974, dis-
tinguished in 14 U. (2d) 157, 380 P. 2d 
(50. 
Corporate officers. 
This section is applicable to agents of 
corporations, but the courts have adopted 
an exception when the person who acts 
under an oral authorization is either a 
general agent or executive officer of the 
corporation. In the case of an executive 
officer of a corporation an exception from 
the requirement of written authority is 
based upon the idea that he is something 
more than an agent. He is the represent-
ative of the corporation itself. Mathis 
v. Madsen, 1 U. (2d) 46, 261 P. 2d 952. 
Dedication of land. 
Implied dedication of land for highway 
is not within statute of frauds. Schettler 
v. Lynch, 23 U. 305, 64 P. 955, distin-
guished in 52 U. 178, 169 P. 459 and 75 
U. 428, 285 P. 1033. 
Deeds and conveyances. 
Several writings may be construed to-
gether as containing all the terms of a 
contract, though only one is signed by the 
party to be charged; therefore, written 
instrument containing offer to exchange 
properties, but too indefinite as to terms 
to satisfy statute, and signed by only one 
party, may be construed with deeds sub-
sequently executed and placed in escrow 
by both parties, for purpose of establish-
ing valid agreement within statute of 
frauds, where deeds were executed before 
attempted withdrawal of offer by party 
who signed it. Miller v. Hancock, 67 U. 
202, 246 P. 949. 
Defenses to action on contract. 
Under this section fraud and deceit may 
constitute the gravamen of an action not-
withstanding that the breach of a contract 
within the statute is incidentally involved, 
and the statute in such case is not a do-
fense. But if the gravamen of the action 
is breach of an oral contract for sale of 
land, it is a defense although fraud and 
deceit are incidentally involved. Papani-
kolas v. Sampson, 73 U. 404, 274 P. 856, 
explained in 184 F. Supp. 231. 
Easements. 
Where contract seller acquiesced to the 
relocation, contract purchaser and defend-
ants ' oral agreement to move easement 
ditch was valid even though contract 
purchaser did not complete the contract, 
and even though not in writing; contract 
was thereby enforceable against a subse-
quent purchaser from the landowner. Ly-
man Grazing Assn. v. Smith, 24 U. (2d) 
443, 473 P. 2d 905. 
Right sought by defendants to maintain 
pipeline across plaintiff's land was an ease-
ment and was required to be in writing in 
absence of sufficient evidence to support 
finding of part performance under oral 
or implied agreement. Wells v. Marcus, 
25 U. (2d) 242, 480 P. 2d 129. 
Oral agreement to execute easement if 
a federal lease was acquired, but which 
agreement was never put into writing 
or executed, could not later be asserted 
as an exception to the statute of frauds. 
McKinnon v. Corporation of the President 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints, 529 P. 2d 434. 
Gifts. 
This section has been applied to parol 
gift of land, where donor exercised acts 
of exclusive occupancy over premises dur-
ing donee's occupancy, notwithstanding 
latter made improvements thereon, but 
not of a substantial or permanent char-
acter. Price v. Lloyd, 43 U. 441, 135 P. 
268. 
Under this section an oral gift or grant 
of land can only be established by evi-
dence that is clear, convincing and un-
equivocal, more especially where the 
alleged donor and donee are close rela-
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tions such as mother and daughter. Nor 
will the mere making of improvements on 
the land by alleged donee suffice to prove 
a gift of the land. Boland v. Nihlros, 77 
XL 205, 293 P. 7. 
Grantee's name not on deed. 
Where grantors sought to rescind a 
transaction because the name of the gran-
tee of the deed did not appear on the 
paper at the time grantors signed it, it 
was held this section required only the 
signature of the grantor in order to bind 
him to the transaction. Hanson v. Beehive 
Security Co., 14 U. (2d) 157, 380 P. 2d 06. 
"Interest In real property." 
Where grnntor sought to repudiate deed 
conveying land because of his incapacity 
at time of execution, and grantee orally 
agreed that, in consideration that grantor 
would let deed stand, he would pay grantor 
for life one-half of crops produced on land, 
it was held that agreement was not one 
for an estate or interest in land within 
this section. Johnson v. Johnson, 31 XJ. 
408, 88 P. 230. 
Oral agreement between builder and 
landowner that building should remain 
personal property is not within statute, 
because not involving sale of interest in 
land. Workman v. llenrie, 71 U. 400, 266 
P. 1033, 58 A. L. R. 1346. 
Leases. 
Under this section, where one executor 
without authority from his coexecutors, 
who were not under disability and not 
absent from the state, made a lease in 
writing for more than one year, the lease 
was invalid. Utah Loan & Trust Co. v. 
Garbutt, 6 U. 342, 23 P. 758. 
Stronger cannot avail himself of require-
ment that lease for more than a year must 
be in writing, when stranger is sued by 
lessee for trespass. Livingston v. Thorn-
l e y ^ TJ. 516, 280 P. 1042. 
/ A parol lease of lands which has been 
fully performed by lessor is not within 
the statute. Greenwood v. Jackson, 102 
U. 101, 128 P. 2d 282. 
-Modifications of contract. 
Agreement^jiltering or modifying ^r^g-
inal contract must also be in writing an_d 
subscribed. Combined Metals, Inc. v. Bas-
ti'an, VI U. 535, 267 P. 1020, distinguished 
in 100 U. 516, 116 P. 2d 578. 
The words "as per agreement of 12-8-
73" written on a check were not a suffi-
cient inemorandum in writing to modify a 
written contract for sale of real estate 
and satisfy the statute of frauds. Zion's 
Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P. 2d 1319. 
Mortgages, and estates or interests of par-
ties thereto. 
Since real estate mortgagor holds title 
in fee subject to mortgage lien, he has 
such estate or interest in land as may be 
conveyed only by written instrument un-
der this section. Bybee v. Stuart, 112 U. 
462, 189 P. 2d 118. 
Nature of writing required. 
Letter from partners to partnership 
employee informing him that he owned 
undivided 10% interest in partnership sat-
isfied statute of frauds relating to con-
veyances of real property even though it 
failed to mention consideration and was 
otherwise not complete contract, since all 
that is required under section is that 
interest be granted or declared by writing 
.subscribed by party to be charged. Guin-
;ind v. Walton, 22 U. (2d) 196, 450 P. 2d 
467. 
Although letters and correspondence of 
parties did not precisely describe mining 
claims nor terms of agreement, they con-
stituted sufficient memorandum of agree-
ment to meet requirements of section 3 of 
statute of frauds. Peterson v. Hendricks, 
524 P. 2d 321. 
Option to purchase. 
Where option to purchase omitted men-
tion of oil or mineral rights, court prop-
erly admitted evidence showing that de-
fendant had leased the oil and mineral 
rights to a third party, which lease had 
been ratified by the plaintiffs. Bench v. 
Pace, 538 P. 2d 180. 
Oral agreement on option to purchase. 
Joint owner of land who had orally 
agreed to, but had not signed, option to 
purchase was not obligated to sell real 
property, and specific performance would 
not lie to compel conveyance. Eckard 
v. Smith, 527 P. 2d 660. 
Oral agreements as to boundaries. 
Oral agreement between adjoining land-
owners as to location of a boundary line 
is not within statute of frauds, provided, 
among other things, the location of the 
true boundary line sought to be thus estab-
lished is or has been uncertain or in dis-
pute. But mere fact that the person claim-
ing title by parol agreement owns land 
adjacent to the land thus sought to be con-
veyed cannot and does not change statute 
of frauds requiring conveyance of real 
estate to be in writing, without regard 
to any uncertainty in location of true 
boundary line. Tripp v. Bagley, 74 U. 
57, 276 P. 912, 69 A. L. R. 1417, dis-
tinguished in 10 U. (2d) 370, 353 P. 2d 
911. 
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If adjoining landowners acquiesce in 
• division line other than true line, with 
••««ledge of location of true line and 
• »ih design and purpose of thereby trans-
l a t i n g a tract of land from one to the 
•4Vcr, such acquiescence alone will not 
•f^rate us a conveyance. Land cannot be 
«»*v«»yed from one person to another by 
m*r*lv changing possession, even though 
MMh change in possession continues for a 
«*•*» period of time. Tripp v. Bagley, 74 
I* S7, 276 P. 912, 69 A. L. R. 1417, dis-
'.•t'uitfhed in 10 U. (2d) 370, 353 P. 2d 
Oral contracts to buy or sell land. 
Mrre oral agreement to purchase land 
f»*»in another is within statute of frauds. 
• Udwick v. Arnold, 34 U. 48, 95 P. 527. 
fa* ol executed agreement, ^ ^ ^ ^ 
^Miile no interest in land can be createSy 
/* ***sf erred, or surrendered by merely parol 
• ».«-utory agreement, parol executed agree-
«*nt by tenant to surrender leused prem^ 
•*% uu8 not void under statute of frauds; 
%*rutt v. llolmos, 35 U. 49, 90 j \ J £ f l - » - ^ 
r*rol partition. 
}*«rtition of land among coheirs is not 
t*#47ective, at least in equity, because 
«*de by parol, if followed by actual pos-
••*»jun in severalty of parcels into which 
*»U was divided. Whittemore v. Cope, 11 
I . J44,40 P. 256. 
A parol partition between joint owners 
•9 real property, when carried out and 
f»4towed by actual possession in severalty 
»f the several parcels, is valid and will be 
«*torred notwithstanding the statute of 
f»»uda. Allen v. Allen, 50 U. 104, 166 P. 
»i*tf, following Whittemore v. Cope, 11 U. 
>•*, 40 P. 256. 
Fart performance of oral contract gen-
erally. 
While verbal gift or parol agreement to 
•*»vey land is within statute of frauds, 
»»<i at law a nullity, verbal agreement, 
t purt performed, can, notwithstanding 
•^.uiremeut of statute, be enforced by 
— art of equity. Price v. Lloyd, 31 U. 86, 
#4 P. 767, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 870. Doctrine 
*f part performance as set forth in this 
• •<l two other cases explained in 6 XT. 
141 18, 305 P . 2d 480. 
Oral contract by decedent to make will 
««viug property to plaintiff in considera-
»•*« of services to be rendered, was en-
'wrmble where plaintiff rendered such 
••rxices as he was called upon to perform 
*»U*r contract up to time of death of de-
4«*4<»d, and during which time he was in 
#.«*M»»*ion of property by arrangement 
«**•!« by deceased. Van Nat ta v. Heywood, 
; : l \ 376, 195 P. 192. Doctrine of part 
performance as set forth in this and two 
other cases explained in 6 U. (2d) 18, 
305 P. 2d 480. Instant case distinguished 
in 74 U. 290, 279 P. 502; 78 XT. 502, 5 P . 
2d 570 and 117 U. 483, 217 P. 2d 566. 
The acts which are alleged to constitute 
part performance must be in pursuance of 
the oral contract which it is claimed said 
performance saves from the death sentence 
of the statute. In Besse v. McHenry, 89 
Mont. 520, 300 P. 199, it was stated: "Par t 
performance which will avoid statute of 
frauds may consist of any act which puts 
party performing in such position that 
nonperformance by other would constitute 
fraud." Utah Mercur Gold Min. Co. v. 
Herschel Gold Min. Co., 103 U, 249, 134 
P. 2d 1094. 
Doctrine of part performance to take 
oral contract out of statute of frauds is 
purely equitable in nature and has no 
place in action at law. Baugh v. Darley, 
112 U. 1, 184 P. 2d 335. 
Whore there was no memorandum re-
duced to writing or no writing subscribed 
by the parties to be charged but the de-
ceased had accepted the consideration and 
surrendered possession there was sufficient 
part performance to avoid the statute of 
frauds and the deceased's heirs and sue* 
cessors in title and interest should not be 
allowed to repudiate the contract. Such 
an act would in fact constitute a fraud. 
In re Madsen's Estate, 123 U. 327, 259 P . 
2d 595. 
Where plaintiff moved from another city 
and took care of personal and business af-
fairs of the decedent in reliance upon an 
oral contract proved to be clear and cer-
tain, the contract was removed from the 
statute of frauds. Randall v. Tracy Col-
lins Trust Co., 6 U. (2d) 18, 305 P. 2d 
480. 
Sufficient correspondence and part per-
formance were reflected in record in un-
just enrichment action to take oral agree-
ment to build house for $3,000 out of 
statute of frauds. Jensen v. Whitesides, 13 
U. (2d) 193, 370 P. 2d 765. 
Advancement of $44,000 toward de-
velopment of quarries was sufficient part 
performance to remove oral contract from 
bar of this statute. LeGrand Johnson 
Corp. v. Peterson, 26 U. (2d) 158, 486 P. 
2d 1040. 
Doctrine of part performance is not 
available in action at law for monetary 
damages for breach of oral contract to 
convey land. McKinnon v. Corporation of 
the President of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 529 P. 2d 
434. 
—improvements and other expenditures. 
In action to enforce parol gift of land 
on theory of part performance, evidence 
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showed improvements were not of such 
value or character as to take case out of 
operation of statute. Price v. Lloyd, 31 
U. 86, 86 P. 767, 8 L. R. A. (N. 8.) 870. 
Doctrine of part performance as set forth 
in this and two other cases explained in 
6 U. (2d) 18, 305 P. 2d 480. 
In action to quiet title, defended on 
ground that defendant had entered into 
oral contract to purchase property, and 
had gone into possession, making of small 
improvements by defendant held insuffi-
cient to take case out of statute of frauds. 
Hargreaves v. Burton, 59 U. 575, 206 P. 
262, 33 A. L. R. 1481. 
In quiet title action in which defense 
was that defendant was in possession 
pursuant to parol gift, evidence that de-
fendant made expenditures upon real 
estate was not sufficient to take case out 
of statute of frauds, even had defendant 
definitely proven promise to give her the 
property, where value of defendant's free 
use of the property exceeded amount al-
legedly spent for improvements. Moffat v. 
Hoffman, 61 U. 482, 214 P. 308. 
In action for specific performance of 
oral agreement to convey east half of cer-
tain parcel of land which was made after 
written agreement in which plaintiff was 
to have undivided one-half interest, evi-
dence that land was definitely described, 
that plaintiff entered on part of east half 
in reliance upon parol agreement and ac-
tually occupied a substantial portion 
thereof, and made permanent and valuable 
improvements thereon, all with knowledge 
and consent of vendors, and that plaintiff 
paid full purchase price, was sufficient evi-
dence of part performance to take oral 
agreement out of operation of statute of 
frauds. Hogan v. Swayze, 65 XL 380, 237 
P. 1097, distinguished in 67 U. 202, 246 
P. 949. 
—part payment of purchase money. 
A parol transfer of land, with part pay-
ment of the purchase money, no possession 
passing under the contract, is invalid. The 
fact that a part of the purchase money 
had been paid was not of itself sufficient 
in equity to take the parol contract out of 
the statute. Maxfield v. West, 6 U. 327, 
23 P. 754. 
Pleading. 
If statute of frauds is relied upon it 
mubt be pleaded. Skeen v. Van Sickle, 71 
U. 577, 268 P. 562. 
By the weight of authority when a com-
plaint shows that the contract relied on 
was oral and within the statute of frauds, 
but the facts alleged are not sufficient to 
take it out of the statute, a demurrer lies 
on the ground that the complaint does not 
state sufficient facts. In this way the de-
fense of the statute may be raised by de-
murrer. Utah Mercur Gold Min. Co. v. 
llerschel Gold Min. Co., 103 U« 249, 134 
P. 2d 1094. 
Recovery of money paid tinder parol con-
tract 
Money paid under parol contract for sale 
of land may be recovered unless vendor 
makes offer in apt time to perform con-
tract. Bacon v. McChrystal, 10 U. 290, 37 
P. 563. 
Where defendant verbally agreed with 
owner of real estate which was subject 
to mortgage to bid the property in at 
foreclosure sale, and to convey title to 
plaintiff for certain sum after he obtained 
sheriff's deed, and plaintiff relied on such 
agreement and paid specified amount to 
defendant who asserted ownership to prop-
erty and refused to convey, held trust ex 
maleficio arose, and was enforceable 
though contract was not in writing. Chad-
wick v. Arnold, 34 U. 48, 95 P. 527. 
Release, discharge and surrender. 
Surrender of interest under contract for 
purchase of land could be properly effected 
without deed or conveyance in writing in 
compliance with statute. Budge v. Barron, 
51 U. 234, 169 P. 745. 
Mortgagor's oral surrender of his inter-
est in the land to mortgagee is within this 
section, so as to be unenforceable. Bybee 
v. Stuart, 112 U. 462, 189 P. 2d 118. 
Rescission or abandonment of contract 
Where right of purchaser under contract 
for sale of land was subject to forfeiture 
upon failure or refusal to make payments 
or to comply with terms of contract, he 
could, with consent of vendor, rescind con-
tract and abandon all of his rights under 
it; and if this is done by any acts or con-
duct which clearly manifest an intention 
to rescind or abandon contract by both 
vendor and vendee, and vendor takes pos-
session in pursuance of parol agreement, 
then rescission is complete and binding 
on both parties. Cutright v. Union Sav. 
& Inv. Co., 33 U. 486, 94 P. 984, 14 Ann. 
Cas. 725. 
Executory contract with respect to real 
property may not be rescinded nor dis-
charged, unless by act or operation of law, 
where neither party is in default without 
some form of written agreement entered 
into between contracting parties; but 
where there is breach or abandonment of 
contract by cither party, the rule is other-
wise. Thackeray v. Knight, 57 U. 21, 192 
P. 263. 
Restrictive covenants. 
Land which was included in unsuccess-
ful petition for rezoning was not bound by 
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*«!firti\o covenants executed in conuec-
*»*m with later successful petition, where 
-**4 although rezoned, had not been in-
•»*4»«1 in later petition and owner had 
•*** tigned petition or document of restrie-
• *t covenants. Gunnell v. Hurst Lbr. Co., 
ki l \ ^Jd) 209, 515 P. 2d 1274. 
ifuclflc performance. 
*+* far as donee's right to specific per-
t^m^iwe of gift of certain land by de-
**••*•«! was concerned, held that, although 
««*4 letter from deceased, as remembered 
%» witnesses, did not contain description 
*t ,4tid in dispute, or refer to it with 
*»**»n.iMe certainty, witnesses' testimony, 
»***n in connection with letter, indicated 
•A~kt land ill controversy was intended, and 
*i^t, notwithstanding fact that letter was 
•*»t numciently definite and certain as writ-
*4 to take transaction out of statute, it 
• »• duty of court to consider lettor with 
.**« evidence and determine from both 
«*.ther parol promise to give land in 
*«ri lo donee was sufficiently expressed. 
**r*e v. Smith, 14 U. 35, 45 P. 1006. 
i «urt of equity will not decree specific 
jaffurmunce of parol agreement or gift of 
«**4 where contract lacks certainty and 
«**|il<>tt'ness and when not founded upon 
«*4u<tble consideration. Price v. Lloyd, 
U T. SO, 86 P. 767, 8 L. E. A. (N. S.) 870. 
la action to have decreed specific per-
f.-finkiico of parol agreement for gift of 
«**4, wherein plaintiff relied on contract 
*# promise of deceased to convey land in 
n**wd»«rntion of services rendered by plain-
f f. evidence held insufficient to support 
•«-4«tfti«.-tit of parol gift. Price v. Lloyd, 
W V. 86, 86 P. 767, 8 L. B. A. (N. S.) 870. 
It IH essential that parol agreement or 
i*f\ nhould be established by clear, un-
««t*iiu«*al and definite testimony, and acts 
• wA.med to be done thereunder, should be 
•*t«*lly clear and definite and referable 
• «/iusively to contract or gift. Price v. 
U,»J. 31 U. 86, 86 P. 767, 8 L. B. A. (N. 
A / »70. 
la proceeding to enforce parol gift of 
«tAd on theory of part performance, acts 
4»*»f prior to contract, since they are 
«**ih«»r in pursuance nor in execution of 
i. are never part performance upon which 
»«• ba»e specific performance of agreement 
*»• roiirt of equity. Price v. Lloyd, 31 U. 
*k no P. 767, 8 L. E. A. (N. S.) 870. 
In proceeding to enforce parol gift of 
»*d on theory of part performance, mak-
**^  vt valuable, or substantial, or bene-
**w*i improvements by donee in possession, 
'» doing of other analogous acts which 
«*M*M render revocation and refusal to 
>i«plete inequitable, is essential to en-
'crriiuMit of parol gift of land. Price v. 
u**.l. 31 U. 86, 86 P. 767, 8 L. E. A. (N. 
* , »;o. 
Equity will not enforce mere voluntary 
agreement or mere parol gift of land. 
Price v. Lloyd, 31 U. 86, 86 P. 767, 8 L. E. 
A. (N. 8.) 870. 
In action to quiet title, defended on 
ground that defendant had entered into 
oral contract to purchase property, held, 
it was not only incumbent upon defendant 
to prove certain, definite, and unambigu-
ous contract for purchase of property, but 
also such acts in part performance thereof 
as in equity are considered sufficient to 
take case out of statute of frauds. Har-
greavos v. Burton, 59 U. 575, 206 P. 262, 
33 A. L. E. 1481. 
An action to collect money due under a 
parol lease is not an action in specific per-
formance. Greenwood v. Jackson, 102 U. 
161, 128 P. 2d 282. 
Plaintiffs who had made a down pay-
ment, had completed mortgage payments, 
and had paid special curb and gutter as-
sessment pursuant to oral contract for 
purchase of realty were entitled to specific 
performance. Woolsey v. Brown, 539 P. 2d 
1035. 
Tenancy at will. 
A contract by a tenant at will to sell 
and surrender his possession of a hotel, 
together with the personal property used 
in connection therewith, is not within this 
section of the statute of frauds. Eeno v. 
Beardsley, 6 U. 208, 21 P. 944, applying 2 
Comp. Laws 1888, § 2831. 
Trusts. 
Where attorney who was heir was em-
ployed by executor to purchase another 
heir's interest in decedent's estate, but, 
after making purchase in his own name 
on representation to vending heir, who 
was unwilling to sell to anyone except 
another heir, that he was purchasing for 
executor, refused to convey to executor, 
notwithstanding latter tendered both pur-
chase price and also ample compensation 
for attorney's services, held that attorney's 
conduct created, by operation of law, 
trust in favor of executor, within meaning 
of this section and 25-5-2. Haight v. 
Pearson, 11 U. 51, 39 P. 479. 
Where property was paid for with money 
of husband, and title thereto was taken 
in name of wife, resulting trust arose, to 
which statute of frauds did not apply. 
Anderson v. Cercone, 54 U. 345, 180 P. 586. 
—evidence admissible to establish trust. 
Parol evidence is admissible to show a 
trust relationship by operation of law. 
Barrett v. Vickers, 100 U. 534, 116 P. 2d 
772. 
In action to impress trust upon real 
property, evidence supported finding that 
grantor's daughter took property by war-
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ranty deed subject to "oral trust" where-
by daughter was to maintain property as 
family home to be used by grantor, and 
her children and grandchildren, for as 
long as any of said persons needed a home, 
with complete discretion in daughter as 
to the time and as to which of said persons 
should use property. Haws v. Jensen, 116 
U. 212, 209 P. 2d 229, distinguished in 12 
U. (2d) 328, 366 P. 2d 594. 
—parol partition. 
Resulting trust in real property will not 
be changed into express trust, and parol 
division of property thus be rendered in-
valid, by mere fact that, after resulting 
trust has been created by law, trustee 
executes written declaration of trust which 
is not recorded and becomes no part of 
record title to property. Rogers v. Don-
nellan, 11 U. 108, 39 P. 494. 
Wills. 
Where will is sought to be maintained 
also as a contract, it must satisfy this 
and succeeding sections of the statute of 
frauds. Ward v. Ward, 90 U. 203, 85 P. 
2d 035. 
Collateral References. 
Frauds, Statute of<3»63(l). 
37 C.J.S. Frauds, Statute of § 69. 
49 Am. Jur. 488 et seq., Statute of 
Frauds § 149 et seq. 
Acceptance: oral acceptance of written 
offer by party sought to be charged as 
satisfying statute of frauds, 30 A. L. R. 
2d 972. 
Agent of one party, or party himself, as 
the agent of the other party for the pur-
pose of signing contract or memorandum 
as required by the statute of frauds, 47 
A. L. R. 201. 
Agent's authority required to be in writ-
ing as applicable to corporate officers and 
employees, 1 A. L. R. 1132. 
Agreement to forego or delay exercise of 
right to foreclose or take possession under 
mortgage, or extend time of payment as 
within statute of frauds, 97 A. L. R. 793. 
Agreement to release, discharge, or as-
sign real estate mortgage as within stat-
ute of frauds, 32 A. L. R. 874. 
Agreement with subpurchaser of realty 
as affected by statute, 38 A. L. R. 1348. 
Applicability of statute of frauds to con\ 
tracts to surrender, rescind, or abandon 
trusts, 173 A. L. R. 281. 
Boundary line established by oral agree-
ment or acquiescence, 69 A. L. R. 1430, 
113 A. L. R. 421. 
Brokerage or agency contract concern-
ing real property as within statute of 
frauds, 151 A. L. R. 048. 
Check or note as memorandum satisfying 
statute of frauds, 153 A. L. R. 1112. 
Conflict of laws: comment note on 
statute of frauds and conflict of laws, 47 
A. L. R. 3d 137. 
Consideration: necessity and sufficiency 
of statement of consideration in contract 
or memorandum of sale of land, under 
statute of frauds, 23 A. L. R. 2d 164. 
Description or designation of land in 
contract or memorandum of sale, under 
statute of frauds, 23 A. L. R. 2d 6. 
Erasure: effect of attempted cancella-
tion or erasure in memorandum otherwise 
sufficient to satisfy statute of frauds, 31 
A. L. R. 2d 1112. 
Extinguishment or modification of ease-
ment by parol agreement, 71 A. L. R. 1370. 
Extrinsic writing referred to in written 
agreement as part thereof for purposes 
of statute of frauds, 73 A. L. R. 1383. 
Failure to object to parol evidence or 
voluntary introduction thereof, as waiver, 
15 A. L. R. 2d 1330. 
Initials as sufficient signature under 
statute of frauds, 159 A. L. R. 253. 
Installation of fixtures as part perform-
ance which will take parol lease out of 
statute of frauds, 10 A. L. R. 1495. 
Joint adventure agreement for acquisi-
tion, development, or sale of land as within 
provision of statute of frauds governing 
broker's agreement for commission on 
real estate sale, 48 A. L. R. 2d 1042. 
Joint adventure or partnership to deal 
in real estate as affected by statute, 18 
A. L. R. 485, 95 A. L. R. 1242. 
Judicial sale: statute of frauds as af-
fecting enforceability as between the par-
ties of agreement to purchase property at 
judicial or tax sale for their joint benefit, 
14 A. L. R. 2d 1294. 
Manner of pleading statute of frauds as 
defense, 158 A. L. R. 89. 
Memorandum which will satisfy statute 
of frauds, as predicable in whole or part 
upon writings prior to the oral agreement, 
1 A. L. R. 2d 841. 
Minerals: solid mineral royalty as real 
or personal property for purposes of stat-
ute of frauds, 68 A. L. R. 2d 734. 
Modification of sealed instrument by 
subsequent parol agreement, 55 A. L. R. 
685. 
^^Qpfion in lease for extension of term or 
/for a new lease as affecting applicability 
of provision of statute of frauds, 161 A. 
^44*^1094. 
Option to purchase property as within 
statute of frauds in relation to real prop-
erty, 61 A. L. R. 1454. 
Oral agreement restricting use of real 
property as within the statute of frauds, 
^ A . L. R. 2d 1316. 
/^"tHtrPsurrender of written lease, 78 A. 
Ih. R. 2d 933. 
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Parol evidence rule as applied to rights 
vr liabilities of eopartieH to contract as 
Urtween themselves or their privies, 129 
A. L. R. 673. 
Parol gift of realty, 155 A. L. R. 76. 
/Parol lease for term of a year to com-
mence in future us within statute of 
V^WMHIS, 111 A. I,. R. 1465. 
Parol partition and the statute of 
frauds, 133 A. L. R. 476. 
Partnership: statute of frauds as affect-
.ng question when real estate owned by 
,..*rtnor before formation of partnership 
*dl be deemed to have become asset of 
*rm, 43 A. L. U. 2d 1015, 
Part performance of oral contract to 
euiwvy being predicated upon possession 
«r improvement by one spouse of real prop-
erty of other, 74 A. L. R. 218. 
Part performance to take oral contract 
uf lease out of statute of frauds predicated 
upon acts or conduct of one in possession 
ut the property under another contract or 
ritfht, 125 A. L. R. 14G8. 
Price fixed in contract violating statute 
of frauds as evidence of value in action 
on quantum meruit, 21 A. L. R. 3d 9. 
Principal's or authorized agent's name, 
,n body of instrument, as satisfying stat-
ute of frauds where transaction was not 
conducted by him, 28 A, L. R. 1114. 
Printed, stamped, or typewritten name 
A* satisfying requirement of statute of 
frauds as regards signature, 171 A. L. R. 
134. 
Promissory estoppel, 48 A. L. R. 2d 
1079. 
Rescission: applicability of statute of 
frauds to agreement to rescind contract 
for sale of land, 42 A. L. R. 3d 242. 
Restrictions on use of real property by 
«ral agreement, 5 A. L. R. 2d 1316. 
Rights of parties under oral agreement 
to buy or bid in land for another, 42 
A. L. R. 10, 135 A. L. R. 232, 27 A. L. R. 
Jd 1285. 
Right to maintain action for damages as 
for breach of contract upon lease defec-
tively executed, 82 A. L. R. 1318. 
Right to reformation of deed or mort-
gage so as to enlarge or restrict the land 
or interest covered as affected by statute, 
86 A. L. R. 448. 
Signatures: admissibility of parol evi-
dence to connect signed and unsigned 
documents relied upon as memorandum to 
satisfy statute of frauds, 81 A. L. R. 2d 
991. 
Signature with lead pencil, 8 A. L. R. 
1339. 
Statute of frauds and conflict of laws, 
161 A. L. R. 820. 
Sufficiency of description or designation 
of land in contract or memorandum of 
sale, under statute of frauds, 23 A. L. R. 
2d 6. 
Sufficiency, under the statute of frauds, 
of description or designation of land in 
contract or memorandum of sale which 
gives right to select the tract to be con-
veyed, 46 A. L. R. 2d 894. 
Timber: standing timber, sale or con-
tract for sale of, as within provisions of 
statute of frauds respecting sale or con-
tract of sale of real property, 7 A. L. R. 
2d 517. 
Undelivered deed or escrow, pursuant to 
oral contract, as satisfying statute of 
frauds, 100 A. L. R. 196. 
Validity and effect of oral agreement in 
alternative, one of the alternatives being 
within the statute of frauds, 13 A. L. 
R. 271. 
Waiver by parol of provision in sealed 
instrument, 55 A. L. R. 700. 
What constitutes a contract in writing 
within statute of limitations, 3 A. L. R. 
2d 809. 
Who must sign and form of signature, 
in caBo of partnership, in order to comply 
with statute of frauds, 114 A. L. R. 1005. 
Law Reviews. 
Boyce, The Uniform Commercial Code 
in Utah, B. Statute of Frauds, 9 Utah L. 
Rev. 910. 
Note: An Appraisal of the Utah Statute 
of Frauds, 9 Utah L. Rev. 978. 
25-5-2. Wills and implied trusts excepted.—The next preceding section 
; 25-5-1] shall not be construed to affect the power of a testator in the 
disposition of his real estate by last will and testament; nor to prevent any 
trust from arising or being extinguished by implication or operation of 
law. 
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 2462; Trusts. 
C. L. 1917, §5812; E. S. 1933 * O. 1943, 
i*-6-2. Trusts arising by implication or opera-tion of law are expressly excluded from 
Compiler's Notes t h e e f f o c t s o f t h e statute; and a deed of 
, , ' .
 A A , conveyance, though absolute in form, if 
Analogous former statutes, Comp. Laws given to secure a debt, is in eouitv treated 
1-70, §1011; 2 Comp. Laws 1888, §2832. as a mortgage-* t r u s t b y TpZuon ot 
law. Wasatch Min. Co. v. Jennings. 5 U 
243, 15 P. 65. * 
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Where one, having no interest in real 
estate, orally agrees with another that lat-
ter should purchase it with his own funds 
and take title in his own name, and that 
he should thereafter convey it to former 
upon an agreed price, no resulting or con-
structive trust arises, and such contract is 
within statute of frauds. Chadwick v. 
Arnold, 34 U. 48, 95 P. 527. 
Trust ex maleficio arises whenever per-
son acquires legal title to property of 
another by means of intentional false or 
fraudulent verbal promise to hold same for 
certain purpose, and, having thus obtained 
title, retains and claims property as his 
own. Chadwick v. Arnold, 34 U. 48, 95 P. 
527. 
Where defendant verbally agreed with 
owner of real estate which was subject to 
mortgage to bid the property in at fore-
closure sale, and to convey title to plaintiff 
for certain sum after he obtained sheriff's 
deed, and plaintiff relied on such agree-
ment and paid specified amount to defend-
ant who asserted ownership to property 
nnd refused to convey, held trust ex male-
ficio arose, and was enforceable though 
contract was not in writing. Chadwick v. 
Arnold, 34 U. 48, 95 P . 527. 
One seeking to have rights declared and 
enforced, founded upon or growing out of 
trust or confidential relation, is required 
to show, with at least reasonable cer-
tainty, the terms of agreement and char-
acter and extent of trust or confidential 
relation. Coray v. Holbrook, 40 U. 325, 
121 P. 572. See also 25-5-1. 
Equity imposes a constructive trust to 
prevent one from unjustly profiting 
through fraud or the violation of a duty 
imposed under a fiduciary or confidential 
relationship. Hawkins v. Perry, 123 U. 16, 
253 P. 2d 372. 
Where defendant altered a certificate 
of sale of land by inserting his own name 
as purchaser and the land was not in-
cluded in the decedent's estate which was 
distributed in 1924, there was a construc-
tive trust for the benefit of the decedent's 
heirs and the estate could be reopened. 
Perry v. McConkie, 1 U. (2d) 189, 264 P . 
2d 852. 
A deed given to secure a debt, though 
absolute in form, was in equity a mort-
gage, so that a trust was created by opera-
tion of law and, under the express lan-
guage of this section, was not prevented by 
25-5-1. Taylor v. Turner, 27 U. (2d) 39, 
492 P. 2d 1343. 
Wills. 
When will is sought to be maintained 
also as a contract, it must satisfy this 
and succeeding sections of the statute of 
frauds. Ward v. Ward, 96 U. 263, 85 P . 
2d 635. 
Collateral References. 
Frauds, Statute of<S»63(l). 
37 C.J.S. Frauds, Statute of § 69. 
Applicability of statute of frauds to 
contracts to surrender, rescind or abandon 
trusts, 106 A. L. R. 1313, 173 A. L. R. 
281. 
Character and validity of instrument as 
contract as affected by provision for post-
mortem payment or performance, 1 A. L. 
R. 2d 1178. 
Decedent's agreement to devise, be-
queath, or leave property as compensation 
for services, 106 A. L. R. 742. 
Enforceability, as regards proceeds of 
sale of property, of real estate trust that 
does not satisfy statute of frauds, 154 A. 
L. R. 385. 
Grantee's oral promise to grantor as giv-
ing rise to trust, 159 A. L. R. 997. 
Trust arising by grantee's oral promise 
to grantor, 35 A. L. R. 280, 45 A. L. R. 
851, 80 A. L. R. 195, 129 A. L. R. 689, 159 
A. L. R. 997. 
25-5-3. Leases and contracts for interest in lands.—Every contract for 
the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale, of any lands, 
or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some nol£_or 
memorandum thereof, is in writing finWrihp^ tyy frhe party by whom the 
lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized 
History: R. S. 1898 & O. L. 1907, § 2463; 
0. L. 1917, §5813; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
33-5-3. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Analogous former statute, 2 Comp. Laws 
1888, §3918 (5). 
Adjudicated forms. 
Form of contract for sale and purchase 
of land, see Talbot v. Anderson, 80 U. 
436, 15 P. 2d 350. 
Agent's authority. 
In action for specific performance of 
contract for sale of real property, held in 
absence of evidence showing defendant's 
agent was authorized in writing to sell 
real property or equities taking case out 
of statute of frauds, trial court properly 
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